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A B S T R A C T
The speed and progress of transitions towards renewable energy systems varies greatly between European
member states. Among others, these differences have been attributed to the emergence of grassroots initiatives
(GIs) that develop radical ideas and sustainable practices. The goal of this paper is to understand the differences
in the emergence of GIs for renewable energy in relation to the institutional characteristics of Denmark, the
Netherlands and Sweden. We analyze the possibilities of GIs to emerge and act within three dimensions: the
material-economic, the actor-institutional and discursive dimension. We conclude that conditional factors lie
within the material-economic dimension in terms of the biophysical conditions, the structure of the economy,
energy dependency and the energy market. Within the actor-institutional dimension, we conclude that the
presence or absence of fossil fuel incumbents, such as regional utilities, strongly influence the possibilities of GIs.
Within the discursive dimension, openness for alternative discourses proved to be enabling for GI-activities, as
well as democratized knowledge production. In addition to these conditions of possibility, GIs can also act
despite dominant institutions, albeit limited. Finally, GIs need a strong network with knowledge institutes,
technology developers and political parties in order to achieve institutional change that enables GIs to flourish.
Without institutional space, GIs remain subjected to the dominant power-relations, and cannot exert much in-
fluence upon the energy system.
1. Introduction
The internationally shared political aim to move towards a sus-
tainable and carbon neutral society calls for transformations of socio-
technical energy systems worldwide [1]. In the European Union, there
are concerns about member states’ deviation from renewable energy
action plans, different speeds and forms of the energy transition, and a
lack of long-term consistency of policies. The energy transition is also
hindered by administrative and technical barriers to renewable energy
(RE) growth, which are often difficult to remove [2]. Despite concerted
attempts within the EU to manage the RE transition, change is thwarted
by vested interests, institutional lock-in and existing path dependencies
in the energy sector [3].
To enable more radical changes in the energy transition, observers
have emphasized the potential of ‘grassroots initiatives’ for developing
radical new ideas and sustainable practices [4,5]. Grassroots initiatives
(GIs) are open and dynamic bottom-up activities that seek to provoke
changes that go beyond or against the orchestrated paths of transition,
but are self-organized and transformational. GIs include local and re-
gional initiatives, established by groups and communities that aim for
more durable energy systems in their direct environment. This includes
NGOs and community organizations, but also collaborations with local
authorities and businesses that are thinking and working ‘out of the
box’ [6].
Although the potential of GIs has been acknowledged [7] attention
from science and policy makers towards GIs has been fairly instru-
mental, selective and inconsistent. Academic attention towards the role
of GIs has been dominated by case study approaches [8–13]. These
studies focus mostly upon the individual characteristics of GIs, their
performance and their role, how the performance of GIs could be
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improved by strategic niche management (SNM) [14,15] or by inter-
mediaries [11,16]. However, comprehensive overviews of the devel-
opment of GIs at the national or international level are scarce [17,18]
[cf. 17,18] and much of the actual potential of GIs remains untapped
[4,6,19].
To understand the current position and potential of GIs, it is crucial
to study the origins and developments of GIs, the existence and ap-
pearance of GIs and their possibility to influence or adapt to their in-
stitutional environment. Therefore, we take an institutional approach to
GIs, focusing on the effects of rules [18], resistance or support at the
regime level [20,21] and strategies of GIs [12]. The central question of
this paper is: what are the conditions of possibility that enable GIs to
flourish, and how do GIs in turn exert influence upon these conditions?
These conditions are categorized into material-economic conditions,
actor-institutional conditions and discursive conditions.
To answer the research question, this paper explores the institu-
tional setting of GIs across European countries, specifically Denmark,
the Netherlands and Sweden, which are chosen because the three
countries have very different development paths of GIs. In Denmark,
GIs have been relatively successful [22–24], but recent developments
have created a less supportive environment [25]. In the Netherlands,
GIs were relatively uncommon until the late 2000s, but the establish-
ment of GIs has accelerated since 2010 despite seemingly unfavorable
institutional circumstances [18]. Third, Sweden provides an environ-
ment where (local) welfare state institutions are very active in renew-
able energy, taking up tasks that would be the domain of GIs in other
countries and hence reducing the number of GIs.
This paper offers a comparative analysis of the three countries,
based on a longitudinal reconstruction and analysis of the development,
conditions of possibility and influence of GIs in each country. We build
upon the seminal work of Jamison et al., who compared the rise of
environmental GIs in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden and ex-
tend their work towards renewable energy and contemporary times
[26].
The next section outlines our theoretical approach and offers a more
elaborate sketch of the used methodology. In section three, each case is
presented. Section four consists of an elaborate comparison between the
countries and section five discusses the main conclusions briefly as the
main points have been elaborated in section four.
2. A co-evolutionary institutional perspective
Following other co-evolutionary approaches [27,28], our perspec-
tive recognizes the evolution of systems and the effect their evolutions
have upon other co-evolving systems. Because this paper deals with the
understanding of the role of GIs within a regulated energy system, we
introduce and distinguish three dimensions, based on the impact these
dimensions have on GIs [see also 18,29]. The material-economic di-
mension, the actor-institutional dimension and the discursive dimen-
sion constantly evolve and influence each other. For example, institu-
tions are being shaped in co-evolution with actors, and institutions
simultaneously shape actors [12,28,30–32]. This study takes a co-evo-
lutionary institutional perspective, in which institutions are defined as
the ‘rules of the game’ [33] including formal and informal rules, which
coordinate governance and in turn can be altered through interaction
[34]. Whether or not actors can participate and have access to decision-
making or to material-economic resources is defined by institutions, e.g.
access to energy markets or institutions of political decision making
[35].
Institutional structures are consolidated forms of interaction of
networking activities, or social conditions to which agents seek to take
strategic action. Through these actions, institutional structures are
being created, enforced or altered, transforming the existing institu-
tional setting. Such a co-evolutionary understanding enables us to
analyze the changes and interactions of material-economic configura-
tions with actor-institution configurations, in relation to an
understanding of power relations and the use of knowledge [31,36].
The institutional structure offers ‘conditions of possibility’: while it does
not cause the emergence of GIs, it may provide institutional char-
acteristics that enable GIs to develop activities or influence the in-
stitutional structure.
The paper focuses on the actor-institution configuration related to
the emergence of the network of GIs in the field of renewable energy.
Focusing on the mutual influence between GIs and their institutional
environment requires an analysis of change processes in the institu-
tional structure. To operationalize these ‘conditions of possibility’ we
introduce three concepts as heuristic tools to create three levels of
analysis, described in the next three sections.
2.1. The material-economic dimension
The material-economic dimension includes the biophysical condi-
tions that enable energy production, transport and use, such as the
presence of fossil fuels, the potential for renewable energy production
and the geographical challenges for energy infrastructure. The avail-
ability of these resources creates (international) patterns of trade and
dependency, and we therefore look at the energy mix as well as import
and export patterns and the structure of the consumer market, in-
cluding common practices for heat and electricity provision (e.g. his-
tory of district heating, central or decentral grid). This also includes
grid infrastructure, ownership and access. The material-economic di-
mension also encompasses the demands for energy and resource de-
pendency, such as e.g. energy intensive industries. The biophysical and
economic circumstances provide conditions that allow or prevent GIs
from acting in the energy system.
2.2. The actor-institutional dimension
This dimension focuses on the dynamic relationship between in-
stitutions, actors, and (formal) regulations, in order to gain more insight
in the relations between GIs and other actors and the ‘rules of the
game’. It includes actors involved in energy, including energy policy
and ownership of energy production, storage and infrastructure facil-
ities. Maintaining a multi-level perspective of governance, we include
relevant actors, platforms, networks, formal and informal institutions
from the national and sub-national levels. Moreover, we look at the
rules which shape the interactions between these actors, including
possibilities and voids for GIs that may differ among countries and re-
gions. These rules include historical governance traditions, the access of
GIs to policy making and implementation processes, openness to
change, and more formal regulative aspects [12,32,37].
2.3. The discursive dimension
The discursive dimension acknowledges the importance of discourse
in the institutional structure. This dimension analyzes how GIs are
embedded in the (dominant) discourses that are present in the institu-
tional structure, relating to both the content of discourses and power
relations. This provides insight in the mobilization of GIs and how they
align with dominant discourses, resist or alter them. The content of
discourses refers to dominant ways of thinking, ideas and ideologies
about renewable energy and the position and legitimacy of GIs. These
discourses can be contradictory or complementary and provide a cer-
tain degree of legitimacy for community action and for the energy
transition in general, and may align or conflict with the motivations and
ideas of GIs themselves. The discursive dimension is clearly linked to
the actor-institutional dimension through a notion of power. This dis-
cursive power, or the dominance of certain ideas about ‘how things are
done’, is visible in political, social and economic interactions and in-
fluences the hierarchies and (mutual) dependencies between actors and
their access to formal power and resources.
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2.4. Methodology
Based on the broad definitions of each dimension that were pro-
vided above, the three dimensions are sketched for each country for the
period between the 1960s and 2010s. The conditions of possibility
within each dimension were then identified inductively through a
comparison between the countries. For each case, the focus is on the
development of the movement of GIs and their interaction between
them and the institutional configuration in which they develop, iden-
tified through the three dimensions. The focus is on recent develop-
ments and the current situation, but historical background is included
where it is relevant for an understanding of the current institutional
configuration and position of GIs.
The analysis is based on three types of data. First, a content analysis
on the emergence and presence of GIs was conducted based on policy
documents, research reports and available data on GIs in each country.
This was supplemented by an analysis on the energy transition in each
country, based on a literature review. For both steps, relevant refer-
ences are included in the analysis. As a third step, we conducted a series
of interviews with key actors in the GIs movement and/or the energy
transition, in order to validate our findings. These interviews were
semi-structured and often informal, and in some cases entail more
regular contact between the researchers and respondents. A list of key
respondents is included in Appendix A. As the Danish energy transition
is the most well-researched, this case is mostly based on the literature
review, whereas the Dutch and Swedish cases use more interview data.
3. The development of grassroots initiatives in Denmark, the
Netherlands and Sweden
Because of different biophysical conditions, economic developments
and political responses to the economic crises in the 1970s and other
institutional shocks, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden are three
very different energy systems. Prior to the 1970s oil crises, Denmark
and the Netherlands depended completely on fossil fuels: Denmark
imported foreign oil and gas while the Netherlands benefited from large
gas reserves. Meanwhile, Sweden knew a growing number of com-
mercial hydropower plants: the majority of the over 2000 hydropower
plants that are currently in operation were established between 1940
and 1980, out of which 200 have a capacity of 10 MW and higher, with
technologies that were largely domestically developed and benefiting
from the favorable biophysical conditions.
The oil crises in the 1970s led to severe concerns about security of
energy supply, and countries looked at alternative sources for energy.
The Netherlands and Sweden explored nuclear opportunities, leading to
the establishment of two nuclear power plants in the Netherlands and
five in Sweden, despite fierce public opposition in both cases. In 1980,
Swedish people voted in an advisory referendum for a nuclear phase-
out, but this remains a debated issue. Consequently, three remain in
operation and the aim to phase out nuclear power by 2010 was aban-
doned in 2009. The Netherlands had a pro-nuclear political ambition
until the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Currently, one nuclear power
plant remains. Denmark did not pursue nuclear power, turning to re-
newable energy instead.
The current energy mix of each country reflects these historical
developments (see Table 1, based on data of [38]). In Denmark, elec-
tricity is produced mostly with wind power and (imported) coal, and
heat is produced using biofuels and waste. Sweden also uses biofuels
and waste to generate heat, but produces electricity through a mix of
hydropower and nuclear power. Of the three countries, the Netherlands
is the most fossil fuel oriented, relying on imported coal but mostly on
natural gas, which is cheaply domestic available and generates revenue
for the Dutch state.
The next sections illustrate how in these three systems with very
diverging policy orientations and energy sectors, grassroots initiatives
for RE made an entrance. We describe the co-evolutions of the material-
economic, actor-institutional and discursive environment that the en-
ergy system provided and how GIs fit into this environment.
3.1. Denmark
The self-sufficiency percentage in total energy production is con-
tinuously decreasing and is down to 89% in 2015, including oil, natural
gas and renewable energy production [39]. As prognoses indicate a
substantial decline in domestic oil and natural gas self-sufficiency
within the next 20 years [40], this development urges Denmark to
continue the shift to other energy sources within the next decades. As
such, the share of renewable energy (mainly wind power) in the total
domestic electricity supply increased from close to 0% in 1985–42% in
2014. The share of renewable energy of the gross energy consumption
increased from 2.7% in 1980–26% in 2014. In the heating sector, dis-
trict heating now covers roughly 50% of total heat demand, and is
based 50% on renewable energy sources – mainly biomass [41]. In
total, green energy technologies now constitute almost 7% of total
Danish export in 2016, or around 5.7 billion Euros. In 2017, a total of
4910 wind turbines with an installed capacity of 5229 MW exist in
Denmark. Out of these, 20% (1082 MW) are estimated to be locally-
owned by citizen cooperatives (549 MW), farmers and local landowners
(484 MW) (based on [42]). Support schemes were developed and con-
tinuously adapted for wind power in general, supporting local owner-
ship in particular.
Already in the 1920s several small community-owned cogenerating
plants started to use waste heat for heating purposes in their sur-
roundings. A district heating association was established in 1957, and
mainly included municipality owned district heating companies in the
larger cities. From 1992–2005 these and new district heating systems
were upgraded to cogenerating plants based on natural gas and bio-
mass. In 2016, roughly 64% of all households are connected to district
heating, which is being produced in 430 heat and CHP plants, and
distributed by 407 DH distribution companies. 341 of the distribution
companies are either consumer-owned and 47 are municipality-owned
[43].
3.1.1. After the oil crises
As a consequence of the 1973 oil crisis and the interest of the par-
liament and the large power companies to introduce nuclear power, a
lot of grassroots initiatives were started that introduced the idea of
renewable energy to challenge the dominant energy discourse. These
new initiatives and discourses overlapped with the critical situation
Danish society was in due to the oil crisis and led to an openness to find
solutions “that could work”. In the 1980s, Denmark had a 2–4% of GDP
balance of payment deficit, a 7–10% unemployment rate and 4–10%
inflation [44]. The hegemonic discourse was focused upon self-suffi-
ciency and focused on nuclear energy (later on coal) on the one hand,
and to a minor extent on energy efficiency, renewable energy and
natural gas on the other.
Many informal network activities in working groups, folk high
schools, and environmental NGOs (NOAH – Friends of the Earth) helped
form the knowledge base for the later, more energy-specific GIs. As
such, new and independent actors were able to explore and articulate
new discourses across ever more segments of Danish society. Local
energy offices were established in many municipalities around 1975,
often with the involvement of people from existing networks. The in-
formal networks of environmental and local activists developed into a
set of influential, national GIs, through the establishment of the
Organization for Information about Nuclear Power (OOA) in 1973; the
Organization for Renewable Energy (OVE) in 1975 and the Federation
of Energy Offices (SEK) in 1977 [45–47]. OOA collaborated with
Danish universities on the elaboration of the first alternative Danish
energy plan which was published in 1976, see also below [48,49].
Specific actors and energy activists had a strong influence on the
development of renewable energy, being linked at different levels and
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in organizations across networks. Such persons played a crucial brid-
ging role, because they were able to bring together different agendas
and improve the flow of knowledge in the growing renewable energy
scene. Apart from that, there were strong links between GIs and the
green majority in Parliament, especially between 1980 and 2001.
Danish governments often rely on a very small majority and also in
many cases are minority governments. This means that relative small
numbers of people can be crucial to the power balance in the parlia-
ment. This played a role when the wind power industry was struggling
in 1986/1987: due to the political force of 100.000–150.000 owners of
wind power shares, companies, such as Vestas, could be reestablished
after bankruptcy [50]. The Danish Wind Turbine Owners’ Association,
which was established 1978, played an important role as a strong lobby
organization in this regard.
Discursively, during the discussion between nuclear and renewable
energy, the GIs showed that renewable energy provided a realistic
pathway for the Danish energy system. In an atmosphere of openness in
the political arena, (critical) inputs from a wide spectrum of (in-
dependent) actors were welcomed. The proponents of renewable energy
(OVE, OOA) had a strong principle of “getting the facts right” and
provided realistic, well documented alternatives to the official energy
plans. These organizations thus realized the need for positive and
constructive communication around energy issues, which focused on
developing concrete alternative solutions to nuclear power, instead of
limiting themselves to protesting against the very same.
The concrete outcome of this knowledge exchange between the
central administrative levels and society were new institutions in the
form of a series of official energy plans (1976 and 1981) and alternative
energy plans (1976 and 1983), with the methodology and structure of
the second alternative plan even giving inspiration to later official en-
ergy plans [51]. The first one of these plans showed that it was possible
to include alternative energy sources, as it did not include nuclear en-
ergy and the use of more coal. Renewable energy sources plus energy
conservation measures could replace nuclear power plants without in-
creasing the use of fossil fuels [48,49]. This knowledge exchange be-
tween official and GI-initiated alternative energy plans led to con-
sidering renewable energy as a realistic alternative to nuclear energy,
supported by e.g. concrete production data. The institution of official
and alternative energy plans supplementing each other continues till
this day.
Besides the (in)formal GI networks including places of higher edu-
cation, an important aspect of the level of actors/institutions is the pre-
existing technical and ownership infrastructure, and the small-scale
entrepreneurial infrastructure. These were, and partly still are, the ty-
pical Danish consumer- and municipality-owned electricity supply and
district heating companies. The co-operative ownership structure in
combination with an industrial structure characterized by many small,
innovative companies and craftsmen, was the backbone of the devel-
opment of new technologies at the energy scene. Furthermore, the de-
velopment had deep historical roots with prototypes of electricity
producing wind turbines already being developed and tested around
1900 (by Poul La Cour at Askov Folk high school) [52,53].
In terms of discourses, creating authoritative knowledge that stated
that RE was true and reliable was essential for the credibility of the RE
discourse. The Danish “culture of experimentation” has led to many
different test cases that eventually played an important role as a show
case telling that wind power was a realistic possibility. In order for wind
turbines and other renewable energy technologies to live up to quality
requirements, an official certification scheme was needed, and for this
purpose, the National Wind Turbine Test Center was established in
1978 at Risø (DTU) [54]. The Risø National Laboratory strongly en-
couraged small companies to act “professionally” in this regard; i.e. to
develop reliable technology demonstrating to decision makers that the
industry was developing in a serious way with a view to international
markets, too [55]. In May 1975, volunteers at the teacher training
college started to build the 2 MW Tvind wind turbine in collaboration
with experts from amongst others the DTU. The wind turbine was ready
for production in 1978, and has produced power since then although
only at a capacity of around 1 MW.
Institutionally, from 1986 to 2000, specific institutional require-
ments supported local ownership of wind power. For instance, an owner
of a wind turbine share was required to have permanent residence in
the municipality where the wind turbine was located1 [56]. Also, the
number of wind turbine shares that individuals could own was limited.
The result of this was that the share of co-operative ownership was
Table 1
comparison of energy production and use. Data from the International Energy Agency [38].
Denmark (2014) The Netherlands (2014) Sweden (2014)
Total primary energy supply (TPES) 16.21 Mtoe 72.95 Mtoe 48.16 Mtoe
TPES per cap 2.87 toe/capita 4.33 toe/capita 4.97 toe/capita
Net imports 2.20 Mtoe 30.51 Mtoe 16.30 Mtoe
production electricity Total 32183 GWh 100% Total 103418 GWh 100% Total 153662 GWh 100%
Coal 11064 GWh 34.4% Coal 32420 GWh 31.3% Coal 994 GWh 0.6%
Oil 317 GWh 1.0% Oil 1906 GWh 1.8% Oil 300 GWh 0.2%
Gas 2096 GWh 6.5% Gas 51522 GWh 49.8% Gas 413 GWh 0.3%
Biofuels 3407 GWh 10.6% Biofuels 3105 GWh 3.0% Biofuels 9070 GWh 5.9%
Waste 1609 GWh 5.0% Waste 3535 GWh 3.4% Waste 2855 GWh 1.9%
Nuclear – 0% Nuclear 4091 GWh 4.0% Nuclear 64877 GWh 42.2%
Hydro 15 GWh <0.1% Hydro 112 GWh 0.1% Hydro 63872 GWh 41.6%
Solar PV 596 GWh 1.8% Solar PV 785 GWh 0.8% Solar PV 47 GWh <0.1%
Wind 13079 GWh 40.6% Wind 5797 GWh 5.6% Wind 11234 GWh 7.3%
production heat Total 122136 TJ 100% Total 147157 TJ 100% Total 179896 TJ 100%
Coal 24648 TJ 20.2% Coal 3362 TJ 2.3% Coal 13979 TJ 7.8%
Oil 1154 TJ 0.9% Oil 21375 TJ 14.5% Oil 3016 TJ 1.7%
Gas 23469 TJ 19.2% Gas 103274 TJ 70.2% Gas 5225 TJ 2.9%
Biofuels 43815 TJ 35.9% Biofuels 1096 TJ 0.7% Biofuels 97888 TJ 54.4%
Waste 25323 TJ 20.7% Waste 18050 TJ 12.3% Waste 40783 TJ 22.7%
Geothermal 83 TJ < 0.1% Other 19005 TJ 10.6%
Sol. thermal 662 TJ 0.5%
Other 2982 TJ 2.4%
1 Until 2007, there were 271 relatively small municipalities in Denmark.
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increased very much to an estimated 100.000 privately owned shares in
1990 [57]. Even though the former ownership requirements were
abolished in 2000 [58], since 2008, according the Renewable Energy
Act, wind power project developers have to offer at least 20% of a
project's share for sale to local citizens [59].
3.1.2. After the liberalization
No central power plant has been built during the last 20 years. The
fossil-fuel based power plants were non-profit (“consumer-profit”)
companies until 2004 and could survive market losses as they per law
had the right to cover their costs by increasing power prices. This
consumer ownership/consumer-profit organization resulted in a less
persistent fight against wind power from the power companies, as they
were not fighting “for their life”. However, the large increase of the
wind power share in domestic electricity consumption during the last
20 years contributed to substantial market losses for large, incumbent
energy companies. Concurrently, when the Danish power producing
companies in 2004 were changed from non-profit (and safe income) to
for-profit companies, they did not gain any profit due to the large wind
power share in the electricity mix. Consequently, at present, the es-
tablished power companies have a strong motivation to lobby against
local co-operative ownership of more wind power. District heating on
the other hand, has maintained its legal and economic status as a
“natural monopoly”, making it possible for the central administration to
govern district heating companies with non-profit/consumer-profit
rules. In this way, consumers are protected through including the re-
quirement to pay any profit accumulated in DH companies back to the
heat consumers [60].
The positive discourse for the growth of GIs was challenged from
2002 onwards, when a new right wing government started with a very
clear policy against green energy technologies. As a result of the re-
moved funding for renewable energy, nearly no new wind turbines
were installed between 2003 and 2007 after the rules of the new gov-
ernment applied. Although the policy from 2002 to 2007 was de-
structive for renewable energy development, it appeared to be im-
possible to stop the momentum of GIs and renewable energy due to the
institutionalization of GIs in the Danish society. By now, 100% re-
newable energy in 2050 has developed into a mainstream discourse
across political parties, industry and society.
3.2. The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, fossil fuels still make up over 90% of the Dutch
energy supply [61] and the share of RE was 5.6% in 2015. The energy
system underwent significant changes in the past decades including the
liberalization of the energy market and subsequent unbundling of
electricity production and distribution, which is still ongoing. The share
of production facilities owned by GIs is negligible, amounting to around
200 MW for wind turbines and 3500 kWp for solar projects [62]. Since
the discovery of large gas reserves in Slochteren in 1959, the Nether-
lands has been a net exporter of natural gas, exporting over 60% of its
production. This came to a halt in 2015, when gas mining was cut
drastically after a series of local earthquakes and following public
protests [63]. Following the discovery of the Slochteren gas reserves,
gas fired power plants took a leap, accounting for around 80% of the
electricity sector in the mid-1970s [64]. Currently roughly 50% of
electricity is produced using natural gas, which is also the main source
for heating and cooking. The gas revenues are a major source of income
for the Dutch state, they were around 7 billion euros in 2015 [65].
The dominant actor-institution configuration in the Dutch energy
system was created after the discovery of natural gas. The 1960s
marked the rapid transition to natural gas and subsequently a growing
power position for the Dutch gas mining company NAM, which holds
the monopoly to gas mining. Energy was seen as an economic com-
modity and low energy prices drew foreign energy intensive companies
to the Netherlands, so the chemical and metal industries flourished. The
Dutch national government had little interference in the energy system:
electricity provision was dominated by large regional companies (with
province and municipalities often as shareholders) and the gas sector
was largely independent, although the government supported the es-
tablishment of a national gas grid. The central government tried to gain
foothold through the introduction of nuclear power and invested in
technological developments of nuclear power applications.
3.2.1. After the oil crises
The Dutch energy discourse changed after the oil crises. The oil
crises had revealed a strong dependence on foreign imports of fossil
fuels, causing the government to aspire a firmer grip on the energy
system. Meanwhile, a public debate emerged on the undesirability of
nuclear power and environmental concerns. The previously stable
dominant discourse of economic growth and technological opportu-
nities was challenged from many sides, including feminism, anarchism
and radical environmentalism. A debate emerged on energy savings,
green alternatives and the declining belief in economic growth.
Simultaneously, the anti-nuclear movement started protesting against
nuclear power for energy production, and a social debate emerged on
nuclear waste, safety and radiation. The public discourse on energy had
shifted quite suddenly and disruptively, forcing policy makers to react.
Despite public opposition, the Dutch government aimed to reduce its
international energy dependence through an increase of nuclear power.
Energy savings already made an entrance into Dutch policy documents
from 1974 onwards (First White Paper on Energy), not out of en-
vironmental concerns but as a means to reduce the international in-
dependence on an unstable market. In the 1970s, energy policy became
coupled with environment and spatial planning, and nuclear power
became the main strategy to diversify the energy mix [66,67]. The 1980
Second White Paper predicted a limited potential for renewable energy
in the Dutch energy mix. Renewable energy was seen as a means to
reduce the consumption of fossil fuels but not to replace them.
In terms of actors, new citizen initiatives emerged as the national
energy system remained unchanged, because the government focused
on plans and debates in the 1970s and. A number of bottom up working
groups and initiatives started on environmental and sustainability is-
sues, such as ODE (Organization for Renewable Energy). ODE started in
1979 as a network for citizens who built their own wind turbines, and
grew to become the umbrella organization for GIs for renewable en-
ergy.
The first RE producing GIs emerged in the late 1980s when some of
ODE's members realized that private ownership of turbines was more
feasible if organized through a cooperative or legal association.
Cooperative ownership was inspired by the ideas of the anti-nuclear
movement and enabled by the 1989 Electricity Act that gave these GIs
grid access and guaranteed a standard price [68]. In 1987 the first
cooperative turbine was erected in Delft. The number of cooperatives
grew to 25 in the early 1990s, and these GIs exploited (and often still
exploit) a small number of local wind turbines and acted on a discourse
that combined environmental concerns with a wish for local in-
dependence. The GIs themselves had fulfilled their own ambitions and
did not intend to grow or expand their activities. The focus in the actor
constellation was on the government and large market players such as
the fossil fuel industry and energy intensive industry.
After the establishment of the first wind turbine cooperatives in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, some years followed in which the only
noticeable change in community RE took place in Friesland. In this
Northern Dutch province a small number of wind cooperatives emerged
with an entirely different goal in mind. Friesland hosts nine small vil-
lages that each own their own single wind turbine, exploited through a
village cooperative or association. These turbines, erected in
1993–1998, are built by local village interest groups, not out of en-
vironmental concerns but with the sole purpose of generating profits for
the local community.
Discursively, following the first IPCC report in 1990 and – later- Al
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Gore's “an inconvenient truth”, energy was coupled with climate
change in the early 1990s, and thus energy problems were framed as
issues of environmental sustainability. Innovation and integration were
main concepts in policy development, as reflected in e.g. the 1996 EET-
program (Economy, Ecology and Technology) that was based on the
premise that technological innovation should be placed in a context of
social and institutional changes [69].
3.2.2. After the liberalization
The late 1990s and early 2000s are characterized by large institu-
tional shifts, mostly regarding the European Union induced liberal-
ization of the energy market, which came into effect for large compa-
nies from 1998 onwards and for the consumer market in 2004. The
process leading up to liberalization was messy and ‘led to a … large
insecurity about the future for all involved parties’ [70].
Institutionally, the complete liberalization of the energy market in
2004 increased the opportunities for initiatives, because energy sup-
pliers profiled themselves as ‘green’ and consumers had more influence
in the market. Led on by a few high-profile activists and media coverage
of pilot projects and the need for sustainability and renewable energy, a
third wave of RE projects took off. The new projects are distinctively
different from the traditional wind cooperatives. Only a few have active
collective facilities for RE production, although most aim to do so in the
future. The initiatives are typically highly ambitious: ‘collectively
saving, producing and supplying green energy’ seems to be the motto,
and covers about every activity an initiative could possibly do re-
garding RE.
Discursively, the long-term perspective on innovation and moving
towards sustainability developed into a jargon on “transition”. This was
a discourse in which GIs were actively supported, perceived as legit-
imate, and in which citizens were encouraged to take up the energy
transition challenge, which is a large part of the explanation for the
rapid expansion of GIs during this era. The GIs movement can be
viewed as a reaction to scaling up, privatization and liberalization of
the energy sector. The government has withdrawn itself from a sector
that used to be publicly owned. Energy companies Nuon and Essent are
even fully privatized and taken over by multinationals. Some co-
operatives felt that this has gone too far, and search for a ‘human
measure’ and more say in the way in which energy is produced: back to
basics. Meanwhile, the liberalization creates opportunities for power
for consumers. The small scale of RE technologies –mainly solar PV and
small wind projects – brings RE production within the reach of GIs.
A remarkable discursive shift occurred in 2010 under the pressure of
the economic crisis and under the liberal minority cabinet Rutte I. RE
support was seen as expensive, overregulated, and ineffective, and an
answer to (future) energy scarcity should be found in – surprisingly –
nuclear power. Energy became framed in terms of energy security,
competitiveness of RE and international trade. The two main stimuli for
RE were the SDE+ (successor of the SDE, Stimulation of Sustainable
Energy Production) and the Green Deals [71]. The SDE+ is introduced in
2011 and is no longer available for individuals, only for companies and
organizations.
In terms of institutions, new energy policies were initiated by the
2013 Energy Agreement, signed by the national government, em-
ployers, business representatives and environmental groups. A very
small part of the agreement was dedicated to community energy, spe-
cifically the ‘zip code rose project’, a case of distant net metering.
Through this model, energy consumers receive an energy tax deduction
for the amount of energy produced within a collective RE project, si-
tuated in their zip code area or an adjacent area [see 18]. The first two
years after the zip code rose, legislation was unclear and it was not a
feasible business model due to VAT obligations. After intensive lob-
bying of GIs and support groups, cabinet and parliament decided to
increase the energy tax reduction from 7,5 eurocents per kWh to circa
10 eurocents per kWh. Despite the still modest profits, 38 zip code rose
projects were realized in 2016 [18]. Overall, the strongly economic
discourse forms a constraint for GIs to acquire a position, but recent
developments of the Energy Agreement [71] and Agendas [72] appear
to create more legitimacy for the idea of collaborative action and active
citizenship. However, GIs act from a discourse of energy transition and
energy-independence, while the government firmly articulates the
economic discourse. Consequently, GIs develop in the absence of clear
governmental support [see 18].
3.3. Sweden
Sweden has a tradition of an industrialized economy. The rich oc-
currence of resources of forests and iron-ore, together with a moun-
tainous north has been advantageous [73]. Sweden is often seen as a
role model in building the “welfare state” in the post-war period, in the
trail of strong economic development followed heavy exploitation of
resources. The strong economy led to an, by international comparison,
early development of nuclear power with heavy state involvement. In
1947, AB Atomkraft was developed and together with large private
companies, the technology was developed. In 1963 the first reactor was
started, focused on research but also on producing district heating, al-
though it was outdated already in 1973, but the first commercial re-
actor was started in 1972 [73]. Together with hydropower, the pre-
sence of nuclear power meant cheap, non-fossil electricity production in
Sweden during the next decades.
Parallel discourses existed from the 1950′s until the 1970′s. On the
one hand, a “supply discourse” focused mainly upon the delivery of
cheap energy to the point of consumption thanks to economy of scale
and an understanding of energy resources as almost infinite [74] and on
the other hand, discourses of conservation and environmental protec-
tion, following debates on the exploitation of the nature [26].
Until the 1970′s prices had in general decreased for almost a decade
[74] and pricing was mainly based on production costs until the lib-
eralization of the electricity market in 1996. The high voltage market
set their prices based on state owned Vattenfalls prices, and the low
voltage market was limited to the law on reasonable pricing and mu-
nicipal regulations on self-cost pricing [75].
In terms of actors and institutions, the structure of the Swedish
society is important for understanding the development of GIs in
Sweden. Especially important is the ‘Swedish Model’ [cf. 74], which
came in place 1902 with the ‘Electricity Act’ and was maintained until
the 1990s. This model refers to major power companies producing
electricity and municipality owned companies that distribute the elec-
tricity [74,76]. In the mid-1930s the exploitation of the large hydro-
power resources in the North of Sweden started [77], but large amount
of power transmission to the more densely populated southern part was
necessary. In 1907 the Swedish government established Kungliga Vat-
tenfallsstyrelsen (today Vattenfall AB). Vattenfall built regional high
voltage cables together with other major power companies. The na-
tional transmission grid of high-voltage lines are today (and since after
1946) owned and managed by the state [78]. The energy market has
significant inertia and low rates of innovation, due to the considerable
capital cost of production and the durability of nuclear and hydro
power.
3.3.1. After the oil crises
A new discourse of efficiency grew in the 1970s, following the oil
crises and that environmental effects, such as acidification of lakes,
forest deaths and first debates about CO2-emissions became apparent in
the 1980′s. The nuclear power accidents in Harrisburg and later in
Chernobyl put further pressure on change. A referendum over the fu-
ture of nuclear power was held in 1980 and even though the procedure
was complicated, as voters decided between three options, the decision
afterwards was a full dismantling until 2010 [26,74]. The solution was
to use nuclear in a transition period, focus on domestic renewable re-
sources, and energy- and resource efficiency [74].
In terms of actors, the debate on nuclear power in the eighties led to
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the establishment of the first GIs on renewable energy in Sweden, the
eco-villages, as the initial pioneers had their roots in the anti-nuclear
movement. They saw their role as inspirers to the municipalities to
move toward more environmentally friendly and innovative systems, as
well as aim for sustainable living [79,80].
During the 1990s and the 2000s, the discourse focused mainly on a
transition to renewable resources, and especially biomass. Several na-
tional policies strengthened this, such as sulfur and CO2-taxation in
1990 and 1991, subsidies for biomass combined heat and power, wind
power, and solar heating in 1991. The debate further changed to an
idea of ecological modernization, as it became obvious that the growth
optimism from the 1950s and 1960s was not feasible when the ecolo-
gical side effects were known. Instead, the ecological awareness was
seen as a driving force and the technological development connected to
it was rather an advantage as it led to progress and growth [81,82].
Climate change became the main issue, to a large extent around the
time of the Kyoto agreement. Global concerns, such as sustainable de-
velopment and the implementation of the Agenda 21 program in most
municipalities, were implemented into the Swedish policy and shaped
the discourse to a large extent [82,83].
3.3.2. After the liberalization
Institutionally, the change in discourses was reflected in the change
of the ‘Swedish Model’, which was induced by the deregulation of the
electricity market in January 1996, in tandem with the globally rising
environmental awareness. The official aim of deregulation was to sti-
mulate greater system efficiency and allow greater customer flexibility
at the lowest possible price through increased competition among ac-
tors. The reform entailed the production and sale of electricity being
separated from the transmission of electricity, thus enabling competi-
tive production and trade. The district heating sector became com-
mercialized at the same time, as heating was now to be sold on market
pricing rather than self-cost price [84]. The ownership of energy com-
panies changed significantly around the time of the liberalization. A
concentration in ownership of electricity companies took place as in-
dustrial producers sold their electricity production to a few actors. The
electricity market did also become international, as Finnish and
German owners entered the market while Vattenfall expanded their
market share outside of Sweden [77]. Municipalities decided to sell
both electricity and district heating companies and today 51 percent
have purely municipally owned district heating companies and 20
percent have private owners, compared to almost uniform municipal
ownership prior to 1990 [84].
The new institutions created by the liberalization opened up op-
portunities for GIs. The first wind cooperative started 1990 in Näs at the
island Gotland. The purpose with this and most wind cooperatives is to
generate electricity to cost price to its members and/or be able to sell
the surplus to the grid. The economic investment support for wind
power helped the wind development in general and cooperatives fol-
lowed this gained momentum [85]. The LIP (Local Investment Pro-
gram) and KLIMP (Climate Investment Programme) programs were
important measures and helped the development of local heating sys-
tems [86]. The green electricity certificate system, initiated in 2003,
supported the development of RE production. For each produced MWh
renewable electricity the producer gets 1 certificate that can be sold on
an open market, thus generating more income. The buyers are elec-
tricity suppliers, which are obliged to buy the certificates [87]. Reg-
ulations and economic incentives have restricted the possibilities for
small actors to enter the electricity market. The network operation was
seen as a natural monopoly and the network is still regulated and su-
pervised by the authorities [83,88].
The energy supply from renewable sources, such as wind and solar
PVs, produced by prosumers started in 1997 and have increased since
then [89]. This is related to the change in legislation which makes it
feasible to sell the own-produced electricity back to the grid and due to
state subsidies and tax-reduction for micro-producers [89]. Since 2009
it is possible to receive state aid for installation of PVs. The maximum
level is 30% for companies and 20% for other actors. Since 2015, micro-
producers of renewable electricity can also receive a tax reduction of 60
öre/kWh [90]. Today there is an increasing trend where more private
households as well as housing companies or real estate owners take
interest in installing PVs. But the market share for PVs is still small, not
even 1% of total electricity production [91].
In terms of actors, GIs were limited due to monopolies before 1996,
due to strong municipalities in both electricity and heating sector and
low energy prices. Incentives were also low, as the energy production
was relatively clean and municipalities took responsibility in energy
transition. Most economic means of control have focused on the large
producers or industries, the municipalities or individual households,
leaving little opportunities for obvious support for GIs. It can also be
noted that municipality owned cooperatives do now exist, and it shows
how municipalities are moving into this new niche. Municipal energy
companies, such as Jönköping Energi and Kalmar Energi (owned 50%
by E.ON) have started wind cooperatives and the latter is starting a
solar PV cooperative [80].
As shown, the power relations were for a long time set in stone in
Sweden, dominated by large players. It is possible to identify some
pioneer GIs, already as early as the eighties, that wanted to give the
power back to the people and reduce the power for globalized com-
panies. A bigger reason for people in Sweden to become prosumers has
been to resist a central electricity system governed by a few multi-na-
tional companies [89] and directly linked to the actor-institutional di-
mension.
Currently, the Swedish GI community is not as prominent as in
Denmark and the Netherlands. Nevertheless, today there are 81 wind
cooperatives that make up around 10 percent of the total produced
wind electricity, 6 active solar PV cooperatives, and 4 more in forma-
tion, producing less than 1,5 MW in total, 10 small scale district heating
producers, 25 eco-villages (focusing on energy savings, biomass heating
or solar PV/heating) and 9 rural communities owning hydro, wind or
heating system, all with an overarching aim of energy savings [80]. In
2012, 25,000 households owned shares in wind power cooperatives
[85].
4. Comparative analysis: conditions of possibility for grassroots
initiatives
The country studies demonstrate that grassroots initiatives in
Europe emerge differently and in very different institutional settings
across Europe, and that characteristics of this institutional environment
may affect their possibilities to emerge and become successful. A
comparison between the three countries enables the identification of
‘conditions of possibility’ for each dimension, demonstrating not only
the influence of a certain aspect of the institutional structure but also
the way in which this can be a constraint or enabling factor: e.g. energy
prices may be left to market mechanisms, which is a constraint for
grassroots initiatives, or feed-in tariffs or other subsidies may be in-
stalled, which could be an enabling factor. This section provides an
overview of the conditions of possibility that were identified though a
comparative analysis of the three countries in each dimension.
4.1. The material-economic dimension
The material-economic dimension displays economic mechanisms
and path dependencies that influence the opportunities for GIs. We
have identified five main ‘conditions of possibility’, which will be ela-
borated on below (see Table 2).
The structure of the economy strongly influences the emergence of
GIs. Sweden and the Netherlands are historically more industrialized
than Denmark, which has a more decentral oriented economy [92–94].
An industrialized economy with heavy industry requires a centralized
and reliable energy production and a centralized energy infrastructure.
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As a consequence of the relative importance of the energy intensive
industries in the Netherlands and Sweden, such as the steel, mining and
petrochemical industry, these industries have obtained tax exemptions
in order to remain globally competitive. Centralized energy production
and distribution are less suitable for renewable energy production (with
the exception of large scale hydro-power as seen in Sweden) because
wind and solar power typically emerge decentralized and did not match
very well with the often continuous energy demand of large industries.
Denmark has a more small-scale entrepreneurial oriented economy and
decentralized energy system, which is better attuned to renewable en-
ergy in general, but in particular to grassroots initiatives which are
decentral in nature and benefit from the absence of large interests and
lobby for artificially low energy prices for the energy intensive industry.
All three countries have path dependencies in their energy land-
scape, in part based on the biophysical conditions within each country.
The Netherlands depends heavily on domestic gas and imported coal
and oil; Sweden on domestic hydropower, nuclear power and district
heating, and Denmark on oil [95]. Once an energy infrastructure has
been established, the large investments ensure that it remains dominant
for decades, a mechanism that is described as ‘carbon lock-in’ [96]. This
holds true for all centralized energy production systems with long-term
investments in production facilities and infrastructure. However, shocks
to the system such as the oil crises have the capacity to break these
dependencies. The reaction of each country depended on their eco-
nomic structure and the availability of domestic (fossil) alternatives to
imported oil. Other shock events, such as the Harrisburg nuclear acci-
dent in 1979 and the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, also impacted
the energy landscape. Again, the extent of the domestic impact de-
pended on the structure of the economy and the biophysical availability
of alternative resources.
The production of renewable energy also largely depends upon the
biophysical conditions of a country. Mountainous regions such as in
Sweden are suitable for generating hydropower [97] and coastal re-
gions, found in all three countries, are suitable for wind energy [98].
Areas with high solar irradiation, found in Denmark and the Nether-
lands, favor solar PV [99]. Out of these resources, hydropower is the
most economically interesting option, posing an advantage for moun-
tainous areas. The high investment costs for hydropower and offshore
wind power constrain GIs, who have turned to solar and onshore wind
power solutions as they are more affordable for small scale projects.
Related to the biophysical limitations for RE are the costs for RE
technologies. Recent decreasing implementation costs for RE technol-
ogies relative to the cost of fossil fuel energy has led to the adoption of
new technologies for e.g. wind and solar PV in all three countries.
However, development costs for RE projects are a crucial step prior to
implementation, and with incumbent regimes favoring fossil fuel or
nuclear solutions, research and development costs have formed a hin-
drance for the development of RE technologies. This was the case in the
Netherlands and Denmark in the 1970s when limited RE development
funding constrained the development of the wind sector. The network
between GIs and the political arena allowed for experiments in
Denmark, but the Dutch monopoly of energy companies prohibited RE
development in the Netherlands. Thus, an enabling factor for GIs is
access to low-interest financing of R & D and of RE projects, and low
installation costs compared to conventional energy.
The competitiveness of RE also depends on the mechanisms behind
energy pricing in a country. When RE is much more expensive than
fossil fuel energy, e.g. when pricing is left to the market and there is no
correction for externalities, a business case for RE becomes impossible
for GIs. This can be solved through subsidies, feed-in tariffs or emission
taxations to account for negative external environmental effects.
Conversely, when renewable energy is completely competitive, it will
be adopted into the (large-scale) central energy production structure
and there is no space or incentive for GIs, and no option to enter the
energy market. This is the case in Sweden: the affordability of hydro-
power combined with the large investments required created a clean,
market oriented and centralized energy provision system in which nu-
clear power is supplemented by hydropower.
4.2. The actor-institutional dimension
An analysis of the actor-institutional dimension yields a variety of
influential conditions of opportunity for GIs, which are listed and dis-
cussed below (see Table 3).
An analysis of the actor-institutional dimension demonstrates that
existing market and policy structures have a large influence on the
opportunities for GIs. The market orientation of countries determines
the orientation of market players and the government's industrial
policy. A focus on international competitiveness creates pressure to
establish competitive energy prices in order to have the national in-
dustry compete internationally. The Netherlands and Denmark de-
monstrate this industry focus since the 1980s [100]. Sweden main-
tained a stronger welfare state in comparison, with a financial policy
that impacted GIs less and was neither stimulating nor hindering.
The design of market rules and resources proved to be crucial for the
possibility for GIs to engage in RE production. Historically, these rules
and resources have been reserved for incumbents in a monopoly posi-
tion in centralized and vertically integrated energy production systems.
The liberalization of the energy market changed the rules and resource
division drastically, but in different ways between the countries. In the
Netherlands and Sweden, more space for GIs was created through more
favorable entry rules and (more) level playing field. By contrast, in
Denmark the low spot prices on the common electricity market after
liberalization formed a barrier for GIs. Consequently, the liberalization
of the energy market enabled GIs in the Netherlands and Sweden by
ending monopolies and granting access, whereas in Denmark it termi-
nated the relatively sheltered position in which GIs had developed
previously.
Local ownership aids local acceptance of e.g. onshore wind projects,
and conversely local resistance increases with the reduction of local
ownership [50]. From their very nature, GIs are locally developed and
owned projects, thus usually having a relatively high acceptance. Rules
to support local ownership or ensure that the projects stay local and
small-scale can therefore favor GIs [cf. 101,102]. These rules have been
Table 2
Conditions of possibility for GIs in the material-economic dimension.
Constraining conditions for GIs Enabling conditions for GIs
Structure of economy Industrialized economy with centralized energy production and tax exemptions for energy
intensive industry
SME economy, decentrally organized energy
infrastructure and provision
Energy dependency Availability of cheap domestic (fossil) central energy sources, fossil fuels state revenues High dependence on (fossil) fuel imports: international
dependency
Renewable energy potential Low (small-scale) RE potential due to biophysical conditions High RE potential due to biophysical conditions
Costs of renewable energy High (installation) costs of RE compared to conventional energy Low (installation) costs of RE compared to
conventional energy
Energy prices Energy prices set by market mechanisms, no correction for externalities. Or: competitive
RE prices enabling market parties to engage in RE
Feed-in tariffs, subsidies on RE, CO2 taxation
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to varying degrees in place in Denmark, for instance, with limits on the
number of shares per shareholder in a project; ‘residence rules’ by
which wind turbine shareholders were required to live in the same
municipality; and the rule that district heating, as a natural monopoly,
should be non-profit and can therefore be consumer-owned or muni-
cipality-owned. However, rules to guarantee the ‘local signature’ of GIs
can also work as a constraint. For example, the Dutch ‘zipcode rose’ net
metering scheme limits the scale of collective RE projects in the Neth-
erlands and is seen by GIs as a hindrance.
For GIs, grid access has formed a major obstacle until the liberal-
ization of the energy market [103]. Until grid access was legally al-
lowed, access was monopolized and GIs depended on the willingness of
energy companies to grant access and purchase their electricity for a
fair price. Dutch energy companies were hesitant to grant access,
whereas Danish companies were more open to wind power projects
because of their consumer-owned and non-profit nature. Not only ac-
cess but also feed-in tariffs or priority access could be an enabling
condition for GIs, as the previous section has pointed out.
Energy companies have a prominent influence on the opportunities
for GIs. Large energy companies with centralized production provide a
hostile environment for GIs, due to their dominance in the market and
lobby strength. Sweden and the Netherlands illustrate the difficulties of
GIs to engage in RE production in such a setting [104]. In contrast,
Denmark shows that smaller energy companies provide a more open
environment for GIs. The fact that Danish energy companies were
consumer-owned is another important feature, because it allowed wind
power cooperatives to be a ‘natural next step’. This illustrates another
important feature of energy companies: their ownership structure. A
century ago, Sweden and the Netherlands both knew a dominance of
regional energy companies. In the Swedish model, production and
distribution were decoupled, whereas in the Netherlands these tasks
were often combined. State ownership of energy companies in Sweden
proved constraining for GIs whereas municipal energy companies could
serve as important partners today. Similarly, the mergers in the Neth-
erlands led to larger and more inaccessible companies that formed a
‘cartel’, which prohibited the influence of newcomers [64]. The absence
of competition and the increasingly central scale were severe con-
straints for GIs, which were alleviated by the liberalization. In Den-
mark, the liberalization had the opposite effect, as state- and consumer-
owned companies with their distinctive culture were suddenly turned
into ‘for profit’ companies, looking for more consolidation. As a result,
electricity companies became bigger in size and fewer in number.
Next to electricity companies, businesses also influence the position
of GIs. A business sector that is depending on the incumbent energy
sector will not be sympathetic towards GIs and aim to maintain the
equilibrium. Similarly, businesses that aggressively develop RE
projects, thereby claiming permits and land or bidding (artificially) low
prices in tender procedures, reduce the opportunities for GIs to develop.
Active involvement of businesses however can stimulate innovation,
which can increase technological opportunities and create a political
and business climate in which innovation and experimentation is en-
couraged. A limited acceptance of new technologies and a risk averse
behavior of the government could reduce the opportunities for GIs,
which can potentially act as ‘testing grounds’ for new types of projects.
The political culture determines the perceived legitimacy of GIs as
voices in the political decision-making process. An open culture in
which (networks of) GIs have ties with local and national political in-
stitutions, such as in Denmark, ensures a better representation of the
interests of GIs than a more closed, corporatist culture with a more
stable group of actors, which is difficult to access and resistant to
change, such as in the Netherlands. In the latter case, the political in-
fluence of GIs remains modest and it was not until the 2013 Energy
Agreement that GIs could participate in decision making. The network
structures in Denmark allowed GIs such as NOAH, OVE and OOA to
participate in decision making through strong networking in an open
political culture. In Sweden, the political culture is dominated by the
strong welfare state and the longstanding hegemony of the Social
Democratic Party, which implemented sustainability programs in a top-
down and bureaucratic manner [cf. 26].
4.3. The discursive dimension
The discursive dimension serves to analyze the dominant ideas and
knowledge about renewable energy and the legitimacy of the activities
of GIs. These ideas are held and acted upon by all actors in the sub-
system, including the different government levels, market parties and
citizens themselves. An overview of the important factors in the dis-
cursive dimension is shown in Table 4 below.
As each country demonstrates, the dominant discourse on energy
and energy policy strongly determines which decisions the government
perceives as ‘rational’. From an economic perspective, protection of the
international trade position and security of supply are main concerns,
which constrains radical RE policies. This can be seen in the
Netherlands, where a strong dominance of the economic discourse
leaves little room for non-dominant considerations of the environment
and of decentralization. Conversely, in Denmark the stronger presence
of the ideas of self-sufficiency and environmentalism provide an en-
abling condition for GIs. In Sweden, the adoption of nuclear technology
led to an energy system that was both cheap and clean; a broad dis-
course that does however not leave much room for GIs, because nuclear
power is regarded as sustainable.
Openness to alternative discourses also entails accessibility for other
Table 3
Conditions of possibility for GIs in the actor-institutional dimension.
Constraining conditions for GIs Enabling conditions for GIs
Market orientation International market competition and lobby aimed at international
competitiveness (industry policy)
National market orientation
Market rules and resources Closed energy market; rules and resources tailored to large
installations and players
Liberalization of energy market, increased domestic competition
Local ownership rules No rules for supporting/protecting local and consumer ownership,
or very restrictive rules
Rules supporting/protecting local and consumer ownership
Grid access and remuneration rules Monopolized grid, no/uneconomic grid access, no guaranteed
minimum prices
Affordable grid access or cooperating energy companies, guaranteed
prices
Energy companies Large energy companies that dominate energy production and
distribution
Small energy companies (including consumer owned), ‘Green’
signature energy companies
Ownership energy companies State owned energy companies Consumer-owned energy companies
Competition and unbundling
Business sector Business sector aggressively developing RE projects Minor share of businesses engaged in RE technology development
early on
Political culture and decision
making
Closed political culture, no access to (influence) decision making Strong networks between GIs, knowledge production and sharing,
policy and political influence and support
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discourses to the political arena: the degree to which alternative ideas
are voiced in the political debate, and subsequently the degree to which
they are acted upon [cf. 26]. In the Netherlands for example, following
international legislation the sustainability discourse has entered the
political debate, but in practice the economic inspired policies continue.
In Sweden commercial hydropower and a strong centralized approach
leaves little room for decentral, bottom-up solutions. In line with the
general openness to non-dominant discourses, the accessibility for these
discourses to the political arena is also an important condition. This can
play out in two ways however. A discourse in which GIs are seen as
legitimate, such as in Denmark (with the exception of the period 2002 -
2007) allows GIs to voice alternative ideas in the policy making process.
But conversely, a complete lack of political responsiveness to public
concerns, such as the anti-nuclear sentiments in the Netherlands that
were met with pro-nuclear policies, can spark large protests and a DIY
attitude in the community that actually inspires grassroots initiatives.
The creation and distribution of knowledge can be an important
source of power in the actor constellation. Preserving a monopoly of
knowledge in large incumbents and research institutes denies GIs access
to a vital resource, whereas a more democratic distribution of knowl-
edge production, which we see e.g. in Denmark, can positively influ-
ence the position of GIs by making them more professional, and NGOs
have a strong influence on the research agenda and on spreading
knowledge. In Sweden, the industry dictates the discourse on R &D and
knowledge distribution, and in the Netherlands the research agenda is
subjugated to economic principles of economic competitiveness.
GIs typically seek to be innovative, in terms of new collaborations
between actors, new ways of funding, through e.g. crowdfunding, and
through local experimenting with new technologies. In order to ac-
commodate this, a positive image of technological innovations is ne-
cessary. Current Dutch legislation for example focuses on low-risk,
proven technologies, thereby discouraging local and ‘new’ solutions. By
contrast, the Danish Folkecenter and other GIs form well-known and
supported testing centers for new technologies. Related to this view on
innovation is the dominant vision of the future energy system. This may
contain a rather conservative Leitbild in which the future energy system
is regarded as a mix of fossil, RE and possibly nuclear power, which can
be recognized in the Netherlands and Sweden. This slows down radical
innovations and large investments in the RE sector. Conversely, if the
energy future is imagined as a decentralized, innovative and hetero-
geneous combination of energy solutions, this enables GIs.
Lastly, discourses on energy are nested in a broader discourse on the
role of citizens and collectivity and the prevailing perspective on citi-
zenship. The Netherlands and (especially) Sweden share an in-
dividualistic culture in which cooperatives are a recent phenomenon. In
a ‘passive’ understanding of citizenship, the responsibility for sustain-
ability issues is placed with the state. This hinders collective civil re-
sponses to challenges, which in a more cooperative tradition such as
Denmark would be approached through a cooperative. In Denmark, the
history of cooperatives in the agricultural sector enabled the
establishment of renewable energy cooperatives such as district heating
and wind power cooperatives. This displays a more ‘active’ under-
standing of citizenship, with participatory democracy and personal
commitment and activism and stressing individual responsibility [26].
5. Conclusion
This paper sought to examine the conditions of possibility for GIs to
develop and flourish, comparing three very different countries with
different grassroots development paths. Its main question was: what are
the conditions of possibility that enable GIs to flourish, and how do GIs in
turn exert influence upon these conditions?
Turning to the first part of the question, conditional factors lie in the
material-economic dimension, including the structure of the economy,
the energy dependency, the potential and costs of decentral RE, and
finally the energy prices compared to grey energy. These structural
conditions have provided a different timing of the emergence of GIs and
their impact upon the energy system. The Danish energy system
changed from a fossil fuel dominated energy system in the 1980s to-
wards a renewable energy dominated system nowadays with a rela-
tively large role for GIs. The Dutch energy system is characterized by
international trade and dependencies, is dominated by fossil fuels and
lags behind in reaching RE goals. In terms of the material-economic
dimension, the Swedish energy system is dominated by centralized
power generation through hydropower and nuclear energy.
The actor-institutional dimension is closely connected to the mate-
rial-economic dimension in terms of the presence of incumbents and
accompanying market rules. The not-for profit status of many fossil
energy incumbents created a possibility for strong Danish informal
networks to develop RE technology after the oil crises (mainly wind)
and to prove its feasibility. The dominance of these fossil-fuel incum-
bents and related institutions made it difficult for GIs to gain real
foothold in the Netherlands, let alone emerge in Sweden. After the
breaking up of monopolies and changing of market rules after the lib-
eralization, GIs in Sweden and the Netherlands had better opportunities
to produce RE, while the liberalization was constraining for GIs in
Denmark because they were no longer subsidized and shielded from
market mechanisms.
The discursive dimension displayed a change from economic growth
towards environmental interests and security of supply. Openness for
alternative discourses proved to be enabling for GI-activities, in parti-
cular when it is possible to produce legitimate knowledge that proves
that RE is a true and reliable alternative, as happened in Denmark.
When knowledge production is monopolized, there is hardly any room
for alternative discourses, as was the case in the Netherlands and
Sweden. Moreover, the Swedish discourse on passive citizenship and
the welfare state leads to little perceived necessity for grassroots ac-
tions.
In terms of the second part of the research question, we conclude
that GIs can exert influence upon their conditions of possibility if this is
Table 4
Conditions of possibility for GIs in the discursive dimension.
Constraining conditions for GIs Enabling conditions for GIs
Dominant discourse Economic: affordable energy and security of supply Sustainability: climate change mitigation and environmental protection
Openness to non-dominant discourses Non-dominant issues such as sustainability and
decentralization are not politically recognized
Non-dominant issues are acknowledged
Accessibility to political arena Alternative discourses are not voiced in political arena or
not acted upon
Alternative discourses are seen as feasible arguments. Or: complete lack of
acknowledgement pushes citizens into protests
Knowledge creation and distribution Monopoly of knowledge production of energy companies
and research institutes
Democratic distribution of knowledge production
Perceived feasibility of technological
innovations
Little importance attributed to alternative technologies
and innovations
Positive image of innovation of technologies and collaborations between
actors
Vision of energy future Nuclear Leitbild, vision of centralized energy production Open to alternative resources and scales of energy production
Culture and perspective on citizenship Individualistic culture, ‘passive’ citizenship norms: state
is responsible, citizens as consumers.
Cooperative tradition/culture, ‘active’ citizenship norms, individual is
responsible, citizens as prosumers and owners of RE facilities.
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done when a country is in search for alternative energy sources.
However, GIs need a strong network with knowledge institutes, (small
scale) technology developers and political parties in order to achieve
institutional change that enables GIs to flourish. The Danish case il-
lustrates the strong networking during the 1970s and 1980s, while the
Dutch and Swedish cases illustrate the marginal role of GIs. In general,
the last two cases show that activities of GIs are following institutional
changes instead of forcing institutional change themselves. However,
our analysis also shows that GIs can act despite institutions, using in-
stitutional work that enables them to adjust to institutions [cf.
105,106].
6. Discussion
Although GIs and other community energy projects have been
heralded as the new hope for an alternative energy future [see for ex-
ample 107], our analysis demonstrates that the impact of GIs upon the
energy system remains low in energy systems with strong vested in-
terests, such as the Netherlands and Sweden. As such, our findings
correspond with the perspective that energy systems can only be
transformed through the transformation of power relations and in-
stitutions [108,109][cf. 108,109]. Our findings are in line with the
findings in Belgium, Germany and the UK, concerning the ‘double
movement’, as Bauwens et al. demonstrate [12]: one the one hand, the
environment has become more hostile for GIs, and on the other, GIs
pool resources and coordinate actions to survive in this hostile en-
vironment. The contemporary power relations in Denmark, the Neth-
erlands and Sweden remain strongly tied with the economic market
discourse which dominates the actor-institutional dimension. As such,
GIs have to act within a discourse that emphasizes for example ‘af-
fordability, reliability and safety’ within a European liberalized energy
market. This environment demands a commercial or businesslike atti-
tude of GIs, in order to compete with market parties for land positions
or tenders for wind projects [110].
Our paper has used a co-evolutionary institutional perspective to
understand how the current energy system evolved in which GIs act. In
addition to the historic developments, we now turn to the current state
of GIs and what this situation implies for near-future developments of
GIs.
In the Dutch case, we see that GIs are scaling up, increase co-
operation with each other and professionalize. Consequently, they act
more and more like private developers. This is, of course, under-
standable, as there is hardly any alternative outside the commercial
market: the space that was created through the ‘zip code rose’ remains
modest and the operating grant SDE+ that exists for large-scale RE is
not economically feasible for smaller GIs, as they lack economies of
scale [cf. 111]. As a result, Dutch GIs are forced to join forces and to
play by the rules of the market, thereby acting more and more as de-
velopers, and less as ‘local community energy initiatives', with the risk
of losing their hallmark that ensured local support. We expect this trend
to continue in the near future, as the design of RE funding in the
Netherlands is unlikely to change its focus regarding projects with a
large installed capacity. The challenge for GIs is to maintain their
identity and support base, while scaling their projects up to fit with
existing support schemes.
In Sweden, wind cooperatives, as the major share of GIs, are
struggling due to low electricity prices and in some cases are not being
eligible for green electricity certificates any longer as the plants are
older than 15 years. It means significantly lower incomes from pro-
duction, which corresponds with the fact that no wind cooperatives
were initiated in recent years. In other cases the technical lifespan of
many turbines is approaching, which potentially implies the end of RE
production of these GIs. Regarding Swedish solar cooperatives, the
trend is that professionalization is necessary in order to survive. Only a
few solar cooperatives have yet succeeded in professionalizing, aided
by the close connections they maintain with municipal energy compa-
nies. Others planned to start a more professional approach but have not
(yet) achieved this. In the near future, as the bar is raised for both wind
and solar cooperatives, it will be difficult for this group to achieve the
necessary level of professionalism with the modest resources they have
at their disposal.
In Denmark, the same tendencies are visible when compared to the
Dutch situation, with the difference that to some extent ‘acting pro-
fessionally’ in the past meant ‘being the first one to make a business out
of renewable energy’. The result was that many former grassroots
members later on had become consultants and developers. Thus, pro-
fessionalization was to some extent a result of grassroots activity and to
some extent initiated by it – instead of being a constraining factor for GI
activities. Furthermore, today, most developers play according to the
rules of the market and mainly try to maximize their profits from RE
projects, with the exception of some innovative GIs, such as Wind
People [110], which specifically have local development and local
ownership in their business model. However, the current tendency to
‘professionalize’ and upscale on e.g. the onshore wind power market is
also being counteracted by municipalities and local citizens who start to
protest against and block large wind farms (e.g. Esbjerg and Tønder
municipalities in Southern Denmark against Vattenfall). Therefore, on
the one hand, tensions between large wind power projects and local
communities are intensifying, and on the other, the space for GIs is
being taken over by private actors. As a consequence, it can be specu-
lated that the onshore wind power market and possibly other RE
markets will see a complete collapse, or, space for GIs to more suc-
cessfully develop failed RE projects might be created again. As this
article has argued, the latter will only happen on the basis of an ade-
quate political framework.
These recent developments show that GIs rely on institutional
support by governments or incumbents. Without institutional space,
they remain subjected to the dominant power-relations, and cannot
exert much influence upon the energy system [109]. When these power-
relations remain unaltered, and institutional space is given for devel-
opment of RE, GIs become instrumental in creating and enhancing
community support for RE. The local and voluntary nature of GIs limits
their capacity for professionalization and scaling up in order to meet
the criteria for funding and market competition, and this will only be
attainable for a few. Thus, participation in the energy system will be
restricted towards legitimizing RE power production, developed by
incumbents within the ‘hard energy path’ [cf. 112] with large offshore
wind parks or biomass co-combustion [18]. In that case, grassroots
activities will lead to path improvement rather than path change.
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Appendix A. Key respondents per country
Sweden
1. Martensson, Kenneth. Solel i Sala och Heby ekonomisk
förening & Sala-Heby Energi solar cooperative, Sala.
2. Andersson, Sven-Allan. Kvarkenvinden wind cooperative, Umeå.
3. Forsmark, Jan. Hela Sverige ska leva Interest organization for
rural development, Sala.
4. Thiel, Pella. Omställning Sverige Transition movement interest
organization, Uppsala.
5. Yones, Stina. OX2 Vindel & Solivind El Ekonomisk förening wind
cooperative, Stockholm.
6. Hägerström, Lars. Solel i Näversjön solar cooperative, Näversjön.
7. Larsson, Staffan. Kalmarsund & Kalmar Energi solar cooperative,
Kalmar.
8. Nyholm, Charlotta. Solbyn Eco-village, Dalby.
9. Karlsson, Lars-Erik. Södra Ljunga bioenergy and heating,
Ljungby.
10. Lundsten, Lars. Barsbro kraftaktiebolag hydro power plant,
Rottne.
Denmark
11. Elling Scheele, Christian. CIDEA Citizen Driven Environmental
Action, Copenhagen.
12. Flagstad, Frederik. GreenGo Energy, Copenhagen.
13. Rasmussen, Lotte. NEAS Energy Trading, Aalborg.
14. Livijn, Kriestian. Dong Energy, Skaerbark Fredericia.
15. Kristensen, Anders. Danish Energy Agency and Ministry of
Energy, Copenhagen.
16. Rask Nielsen, Poul. EnergiByen Frederikshavn municipality and
Energy City, Frederikshavn.
17. Langbak Hansen, Louise. Region Midtjylland, Viborg.
18. Vangstrup, Lea, Wind People NGO and Aero wind grassroots
initiative, Skørping.
19. Madsen, Svenning. Arhus Bugt near shore wind community in-
itiative, Arhus.
20. Christensen, Peter. Samsø Energy Academy, Samsø.
21. Brodersen, Hans Jørgen. DanWEC Danish Wave Energy Centre,
Hanstholm.
22. Krogsager, Mette. Folkecenter research and development fa-
cility, Ydby.
The Netherlands
23. Zomer, Siward. ODE Decentraal umbrella organization for re-
newable energy cooperatives, Utrecht.
24. Prins, Katrien. HIER Opgewekt platform for grassroots in-
itiatives for renewable energy, Utrecht.
25. Olthuis, Felix. DE Unie, umbrella organization for renewable
energy producing initiatives, and Kennemerwind wind cooperative,
Utrecht.
26. De Ridder, Pim. Windpark Nijmegen wind cooperative,
Nijmegen.
27. Van Nistelrooij, Bas. Noviovolta community initiative for solar
power, Nijmegen.
28. De Meijer, Alex. Gelderse Natuur- en Milieufederatie, provincial
umbrella for local and regional environmental associations, Arnhem.
29. Boot, Pieter. PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency, Bilthoven.
30. Van der Leij, Ernst. Morgen Groene Energie community solar
cooperative, Nuenen.
31. Bekhuis, Jan, Province of Gelderland, Arnhem.
32. Sommerdijk, Felix. Zonnepark Nederland, Installer collective PV
solar parks, Nijmegen.
33 De la Court, Thijs. Gelders Energie Akkoord, energy agreement
Province of Gelderland, Lochem.
34. Stevens, Ruud. Energiefonds Overijssel, regional energy fund
Province of Overijssel, Zwolle.
References
[1] EPC, E.P.a.C. (EPC) (Ed.), Directive 2009/28/EC, Official Journal of the European
Union, Brussels, 2009.
[2] EC, Renewable Energy Progress Report, European Commission (EC), Brussels,
2013.
[3] S.O. Negro, F. Alkemade, M.P. Hekkert, Why does renewable energy diffuse so
slowly? A review of innovation system problems, Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 16
(6) (2012) 3836–3846.
[4] G. Seyfang, A. Smith, Grassroots innovations for sustainable development: towards
a new research and policy agenda, Environ. Pol. 16 (4) (2007) 584–603.
[5] F. Hvelplund, Innovative democracy and renewable energy strategies: a full-scale
experiment in Denmark 1976–2010, in: M. Järvelä, S. Juhola (Eds.), Energy,
Policy, and the Environment, Springer, New York & Dordrecht, 2011, pp. 89–113.
[6] M. Ornetzeder, H. Rohracher, Of solar collectors, wind power, and car sharing:
comparing and understanding successful cases of grassroots innovations, Global
Environ. Change 23 (5) (2013) 856–867.
[7] A. Smith, et al., Making the most of community energies: three perspectives on
grassroots innovation, Environ. Plann. A 48 (2) (2015) 407–432.
[8] J.A.M. Hufen, J.F.M. Koppenjan, Local renewable energy cooperatives: revolution
in disguise? Energy Sustain. Soc. 5 (1) (2015) 1–14.
[9] T. Hoppe, et al., Local governments supporting local energy initiatives: lessons
from the best practices of Serbeck (Germany) and Lochem (The Netherlands),
Sustainability 7 (2) (2015) 1900–1931.
[10] T. van der Schoor, B. Scholtens, Power to the people: local community initiatives
and the transition to sustainable energy, Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 43 (0)
(2015) 666–675.
[11] G. Seyfang, et al., A grassroots sustainable energy niche? Reflections on commu-
nity energy in the UK, Environ. Innov. Soc. Transit. 13 (0) (2014) 21–44.
[12] T. Bauwens, B. Gotchev, L. Holstenkamp, What drives the development of com-
munity energy in Europe? The case of wind power cooperatives, Energy Res. Soc.
Sci. 13 (2016) 136–147.
[13] S.C. Klain, et al., Will communities open-up to offshore wind? Lessons learned
from New England islands in the United States, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 34 (2017)
13–26.
[14] J. Schot, F.W. Geels, Strategic niche management and sustainable innovation
journeys: theory, findings, research agenda, and policy, Technol. Anal. Strateg.
Manage. 20 (5) (2008) 537–554.
[15] A. Smith, R. Raven, What is protective space? Reconsidering niches in transitions
to sustainability, Res. Policy 41 (6) (2012) 1025–1036.
[16] T. Hargreaves, et al., Grassroots innovations in community energy: the role of
intermediaries in niche development, Global Environ. Change 23 (5) (2013)
868–880.
[17] N. Magnani, G. Osti, Does civil society matter? Challenges and strategies of
grassroots initiatives in Italy's energy transition, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 13 (2016)
148–157.
[18] M. Oteman, H.-J. Kooij, M. Wiering, Pioneering renewable energy in an economic
energy policy system: the history and development of Dutch grassroots initiatives,
Sustainability 9 (4) (2017) 550.
[19] F.W. Geels, The multi-level perspective on sustainability transitions: responses to
seven criticisms, Environ. Innov. Soc. Transit. 1 (1) (2011) 24–40.
[20] F. Kern, A. Smith, Restructuring energy systems for sustainability? Energy tran-
sition policy in the Netherlands, Energy Policy 36 (11) (2008) 4093–4103.
[21] C.A. Miller, J. Richter, J. O’Leary, Socio-energy systems design: a policy frame-
work for energy transitions, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 6 (2015) 29–40.
[22] H. Lund, Choice awareness: the development of technological and institutional
choice in the public debate of Danish energy planning, J. Environ. Policy Plann. 2
(3) (2000) 249–259.
[23] H. Lund, The implementation of renewable energy systems: lessons learned from
the Danish case, Energy 35 (10) (2010) 4003–4009.
[24] M. Mendonça, S. Lacey, F. Hvelplund, Stability, participation and transparency in
renewable energy policy: lessons from Denmark and the United States, Policy Soc.
27 (4) (2009) 379–398.
[25] K. Sperling, F. Hvelplund, B.V. Mathiesen, Evaluation of wind power planning in
Denmark – towards an integrated perspective, Energy 35 (12) (2010) 5443–5454.
[26] A. Jamison, et al., The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness: A
Comparative Study of Environmental Movements in Sweden, Denmark and the
Netherlands Vol. 1 Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1990.
[27] T.J. Foxon, A coevolutionary framework for analysing a transition to a sustainable
low carbon economy, Ecol. Econ. 70 (12) (2011) 2258–2267.
[28] K.A.M. Van Assche, R. Beunen, M. Duineveld, Evolutionary governance theory. An
introduction, Springer Briefs in Economics, Springer International Publishing,
New York, 2014.
[29] M. Oteman, M. Wiering, J.-K. Helderman, The institutional space of community
initiatives for renewable energy: a comparative case study of the Netherlands,
Germany and Denmark, Energy Sustain. Soc. 4 (1) (2014) 11.
[30] P. Andrews-Speed, Applying institutional theory to the low-carbon energy tran-
sition, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 13 (2016) 216–225.
[31] R. Beunen, K. Van Assche, M. Duineveld, Evolutionary Governance Theory: Theory
and Applications, Springer International Publishing, Dordrecht, 2015.
[32] S. Wirth, Communities matter: institutional preconditions for community renew-
able energy, Energy Policy 70 (2014) 236–246.
[33] D.C. North, J. Alt, D.C. North (Eds.), Institutions, Institutional Change and
H.-J. Kooij et al. Energy Research & Social Science 37 (2018) 52–64
63
Economic Performance Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions,
Cambridge University Press, New York, 1990.
[34] D.C. North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2005.
[35] S. Becker, M. Naumann, Energy democracy: mapping the debate on energy al-
ternatives, Geogr. Compass 11 (8) (2017) e12321-n/a.
[36] H.J. Kooij, Object formation and subject formation: the innovation campus in the
Netherlands, Plann. Theory 14 (4) (2015) 339–359.
[37] S. Wirth, et al., Informal institutions matter: professional culture and the devel-
opment of biogas technology, Environ. Innov. Soc. Transit. 8 (2013) 20–41.
[38] International Energy Agency, Statistics by Country, (2017) Available from: http://
www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/.
[39] Danish Energy Agency, Danish Energy Statistics, (2016) Copenhagen.
[40] Danish Energy Agency, Oil and Gas Production in Denmark 2014, (2015)
Copenhagen.
[41] Dansk Fjernvarme, Dansk Fjernvarme – Statistik 2016. Halvdelen Af Fjernvarmen
Er Nu Co2-neutral, (2017) (Kolding).
[42] Danish Energy Agency, Master Data Register of Wind Turbines, (2017)
Copenhagen.
[43] Energitilsynet, Energitilsynets Fjernvarmestatistik December 2016, (2016) Valby).
[44] B. Brøndum, M. Mackie, K. Elkjær Nielsen, 60 a°r i tal – Danmark siden 2. ver-
denskrig, Danmarks Statistik, 2008, 2017.
[45] Johnsen Nielsen, Å. Et udviklingsforløb, E. Beuse et al. (Eds.) 2000,
Organisationen for Vedvarende Energi: Århus.
[46] E. Beuse, et al., E. Beuse (Ed.), Græsrods-ursumpen, in Vedvarende energi i
Danmark - En krønike om 25 opvækstår 1975–2000, Organisationen for
Vedvarende Energi, Århus, 2000.
[47] E. Beuse, et al., E. Beuse (Ed.), Energikontorerne organiserer sig, in Vedvarende
energi i Danmark – En krønike om 25 opvækstår 1975–2000, Organisationen for
Vedvarende Energi, Århus, 2000.
[48] S. Blegaa, et al., Sketch of an Alternative Energy Plan for Denmark, (1976)
Copenhagen.
[49] S. Blegaa, et al., Alternative Danish energy planning, Energy Policy 5 (2) (1977)
87–94.
[50] F. Hvelplund, Innovative democracy, political economy, and the transition to re-
newable energy. A full-scale experiment in Denmark 1976–2013. environmental
research, Eng. Manage. 66 (4) (2013) 5–21.
[51] N.I. Meyer, Anden Alternative Energiplan 1983, Organisationen for Vedvarende
Energi, Århus, 2000.
[52] Elmuseet, et al., Kapitler af Vindkraftens Historie, 6th ed., Elmuseet; Poul la Cour
Museet; Nordisk Folkecenter for Vedvarende Energi; Danmarks
Vindkrafthistoriske Samling, Bjerringbro, 2010.
[53] U. Geertsen, Vindkrafteventyret – og de globale kriser, Klim, Århus, 2009, p. 286.
[54] N.I. Meyer, et al., E. Beuse (Ed.), Prøvestationer for VE og information om VE,
Organisationen for Vedvarende Energi, Århus, 2000.
[55] N.I. Meyer, Renewable energy policy in Denmark, Energy Sustain. Dev. 8 (1)
(2004) 25–35.
[56] M. Bolinger, Community Wind Power Ownership Schemes in Europe and Their
Relevance to the United States, (2001) Berkeley.
[57] N. Fuglsang, Fra oliekrise til grøn vækst, (2011).
[58] Danish Ministry of the Environment, Executive Order Regarding the Amendment
of the Executive Order Regarding the Connection of Wind Turbines to the Grid
(Bekendtgørelse Om ændring Af Bekendtgørelse Om Vindmøllers Tilslut- Ning Til
Elnettet), Danish Ministry of the Environment, Copenhagen, 2000.
[59] Energi- Forsynings- og Klimaministeriet, Bekendtgørelse af lov om fremme af
vedvarende energi, Copenhagen, Energi-, Forsynings- og Klimaministeriet, 2016.
[60] A. Chittum, P.A. Østergaard, How Danish communal heat planning empowers
municipalities and benefits individual consumers, Energy Policy 74 (C) (2014)
465–474.
[61] OECD, OECD Environmental Performance Reviews. The Netherlands 2015, OECD
Publishing, Paris, 2015.
[62] A.M. Schwencke, Lokale energiemonitor 2015. Burgers participeren in energie
Resultaten en impact van de burgerenergiebeweging, HIER opgewekt, Utrecht,
2015.
[63] CBS, De invloed van de aardgaswinning op de Nederlandse economie, Centraal
Bureau voor de Statistiek, Den Haag, 2015.
[64] G. Verbong, F. Geels, The ongoing energy transition: lessons from a socio-tech-
nical, multi-level analysis of the Dutch electricity system (1960–2004), Energy
Policy 35 (2) (2007) 1025–1037.
[65] Rijksoverheid, Miljoenennota 2016. Nota over de toestand van ‘s Rijks financiën,
Ministry of Finance, The Hague, 2015.
[66] Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, First White Paper on Energy (Eerste
Energienota), Tweede kamer, The Hague, 1974 zitting 1974–1975, 13122ms. 1–2.
[67] A. van Hal, Beyond the Backyard: Sustainable Housing Experiences in Their
National Context, Uitgeverij Aeneas, Best, 2000, p. 73.
[68] S. Agterbosch, Empowering Wind Power; on Social and Institutional Conditions
Affecting the Performance of Entrepreneurs in the Wind Power Supply Market in
the Netherlands, Utrecht University, Utrecht, 2006.
[69] F.A. Van der Loo, Op weg naar het zuiden, Maurits Groen Milieucommunicatie,
Haarlem, 2012.
[70] G. Verbong, et al., Een kwestie van lange adem: de geschiedenis van duurzame
energie in Nederland, Aeneas, Boxtel, 2001, p. 423.
[71] SER, Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei, Sociaal-Economische Raad, Den Haag,
2013.
[72] EZ, Energieagenda Naar een CO2-arme energievoorziening, Ministerie van
Economische Zaken, Den Haag, 2016.
[73] J. Hult, Svensk teknikhistoria, Gidlund, Hedemora, 1989.
[74] A. Kaijser, A. Mogren, P. Steen, Att ändra riktning: villkor för ny energiteknik,
Allmänna förlaget, Stockholm, 1988.
[75] M. Bladh, En elektrisk historia: elsystemets och elanvändningens utveckling i
Sverige, Linköpings universitet, Linköpings, 2002.
[76] L.J. Lundgren, Energipolitik i Sverige 1890–1975: Sammanfattning av studie
utarbetad på uppdrag av framtidsstudien Energi och Samhälle, Projektgruppen
Energi och samhälle, Sekretariatet för framtidsstudier, Stockholm, 1978.
[77] P. Högselius, A. Kaijser, När folkhemselen blev internationell: Elavregleringen i
historiskt perspektiv, Stockholm, SNS förlag, 2007.
[78] J. Palm, V. Marcou, L'Administration communale du système de l'énergie en
Suède-une perspective historique et les développements actuels, in: G. Marcou,
H. Wollmann (Eds.), Annuaire 2007 des collectivités locales, CNRS Éditions, Paris,
2007, pp. 145–160.
[79] L. Baas, D. Magnusson, S. Mejía-Dugand, Emerging Selective Enlightened Self-
Interest Trends in Society: Consequences for Demand and Supply of Renewable
Energy, Linköping University Electronic Press;, 2014.
[80] D. Magnusson, J. Palm, Come together – historic development of Swedish Energy
Communities. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions (submitted).
[81] J. Anshelm, Mellan frälsning och domedag: om kärnkraftens politiska idéhistoria i
Sverige 1945–1999, Symposioum, 2000.
[82] A.-S. Kall, Förnyelse med förhinder: Den riksdagspolitiska debatten om
omställningen av energisystemet 1980–2010, Linköping University Electronic
Press, 2011.
[83] J. Palm, Makten över energin: policyprocesser i två kommuner 1977–2001,
Linköping University Electronic Press, Linköping, 2004.
[84] D. Magnusson, Who brings the heat? – From municipal to diversified ownership in
the Swedish district heating market post-liberalization, Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 22
(2016) 198–209.
[85] T. Wizelius, Vindkraft tillsammans: handbok för vindkooperativ, Vindform förlag,
Stockholm, 2012.
[86] Naturvårdsverket, Klimatinvesteringsprogrammen Klimp 2003–2012 Slutrapport.
Rapport 6517, Naturvårdsverket, Stockholm, 2013.
[87] Swedish Energy Agency, Om elcertifikatsystemet, (2017) 7 July 2017; Available
from: http://www.energimyndigheten.se/fornybart/elcertifikatsystemet/om-
elcertifikatsystemet/.
[88] J. Palm, Development of sustainable energy systems in Swedish municipalities: a
matter of path dependency and power relations, Local Environ. 11 (4) (2006)
445–457.
[89] J. Palm, M. Tengvard, Motives for and barriers to household adoption of small-
scale production of electricity: examples from Sweden, Sustain.: Sci. Pract. Policy
7 (1) (2011) 6–15.
[90] Swedish Energy Agency, Energiläget 2015, Energimyndigheten, Eskilstuna, 2015.
[91] Swedish Energy Agency, Energiläget 2016, Energimyndigheten, Eskilstuna, 2016.
[92] L. Magnusson, An Economic History of Sweden Vol. 16 Routledge, London, 2000.
[93] J.L. Van Zanden, The Economic History of the Netherlands 1914–1995: A Small
Open Economy in the 'Long' Twentieth Century Vol. 1 Routledge, London, 2005.
[94] I. Henriksen, An Economic History of Denmark, EH. Net Encyclopedia, 2006
(October).
[95] J. Notenboom, P. Boot, An Essay on the Colourful Scene of Europe's Energy
Transition, PBL, den Haag, 2016.
[96] K.C. Seto, et al., Carbon lock-in: types, causes, and policy implications, Annu. Rev.
Environ. Resour. 41 (2016) 425–452.
[97] B. Lehner, G. Czisch, S. Vassolo, Europe’s Hydropower Potential Today and in the
Future, EuroWasser: Model-based Assessment of European Water Resources and
Hydrology in the Face of Global Change, Kassel, 2001 (Chapter 8).
[98] European Environment Agency, Europe's Onshore and Offshore Wind Energy
Potential. An Assessment of Environmental and Economic Constraints, European
Environment Agency, Copenhagen, 2009.
[99] Institute for Energy and Transport, Solar Radiation and Photovoltaic Electricity
Potential Country and Regional Maps for Europe, (2017) (11 April 2017, Available
from:), http://re.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pvgis/cmaps/eur.htm.
[100] B. Södersten, Globalization and the Welfare State, Palgrave Macmillan,
Basingstoke and New York, 2004.
[101] F. Hvelplund, B. Möller, K. Sperling, Local ownership: smart energy systems and
better wind power economy, Energy Strategy Rev. 1 (3) (2013) 164–170.
[102] K. Sperling, How does a pioneer community energy project succeed in practice?
The case of the Samsø Renewable Energy Island, Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 71
(2017) 884–897.
[103] J. Lipp, Lessons for effective renewable electricity policy from Denmark, Germany
and the United Kingdom, Energy Policy 35 (11) (2007) 5481–5495.
[104] S. Agterbosch, The wind-power market in the Netherlands, in: P.A. Strachan,
D. Lal, D. Toke (Eds.), Wind Power and Power Politics: International Perspectives,
Routledge, New York & London, 2009, pp. 59–85.
[105] T.B. Lawrence, R. Suddaby, et al., institutions and institutional work, in: S.R. Clegg
(Ed.), The Sage Handbook of Organization Studies, Sage, London, 2006, pp.
215–254.
[106] R. Beunen, J.J. Patterson, Analysing institutional change in environmental gov-
ernance: exploring the concept of ‘institutional work’, J. Environ. Plann. Manage.
(2017) 1–18.
[107] J. Rotmans, In het oog van de orkaan: Nederland in transitie, Aeneas, Boxtel,
2012, p. 270.
[108] L. Gailing, Transforming energy systems by transforming power relations. Insights
from dispositive thinking and governmentality studies, Innov.: Eur. J. Soc. Sci.
Res. 29 (3) (2016) 243–261.
[109] M. Markantoni, Low carbon governance: mobilizing community energy through
top-down support? Environ. Policy Gov. 26 (3) (2016) 155–169.
[110] L.K. Jensen, K. Sperling, Who Should Own the Nearshore Wind Turbines?: A Case
Study of the Wind &Welfare Project, Aalborg University, Department of
Development and Planning, Aalborg, 2016.
[111] A.L. Berka, et al., A comparative analysis of the costs of onshore wind energy: is
there a case for community-specific policy support? Energy Policy 106 (2017)
394–403.
[112] P.A. Strachan, et al., Promoting community renewable energy in a corporate en-
ergy world, Sustainable Development 23 (2) (2015) 96–109.
H.-J. Kooij et al. Energy Research & Social Science 37 (2018) 52–64
64
